Complete MITRE ATT&CK reference - 14 tactics, key techniques per tactic, APT group mapping, detection engineering, attack chains, and interactive coverage tools.
| ID | Name | Description |
|---|---|---|
| TA0043 | Reconnaissance | Gather information about the target before compromise (OSINT, active scanning, social engineering) |
| TA0042 | Resource Development | Acquire or create resources (infrastructure, accounts, tooling) to support operations |
| TA0001 | Initial Access | Gain a first foothold into the target network |
| TA0002 | Execution | Run malicious code on a local or remote system |
| TA0003 | Persistence | Maintain access across reboots, credential changes, or interruptions |
| TA0004 | Privilege Escalation | Obtain higher-level permissions (SYSTEM, root, Domain Admin) |
| TA0005 | Defense Evasion | Avoid detection by security mechanisms (AV, EDR, SIEM) |
| TA0006 | Credential Access | Steal credentials (passwords, tokens, hashes, Kerberos tickets) |
| TA0007 | Discovery | Enumerate the environment: systems, networks, users, configurations |
| TA0008 | Lateral Movement | Move to other systems within the internal network |
| TA0009 | Collection | Gather data of interest before exfiltration |
| TA0011 | Command and Control | Establish and maintain communications with compromised systems |
| TA0010 | Exfiltration | Transfer collected data out of the target network |
| TA0040 | Impact | Manipulate, disrupt, or destroy systems and data |
Curated selection of the most commonly observed techniques in real-world incidents and red team operations (10-14 per tactic). ATT&CK Enterprise documents 200+ techniques and 400+ sub-techniques. For the complete matrix, see MITRE ATT&CK Enterprise Techniques. For an interactive view, see the Coverage Matrix widget below.
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1595.001 | Active Scanning: IP Blocks | nmap, masscan, zmap of target ranges |
| T1595.002 | Active Scanning: Vulnerability Scanning | Nessus, Nuclei, OpenVAS against exposed services |
| T1592.001 | Gather Victim Host Info: Hardware | Identify target hardware via job postings, docs |
| T1592.004 | Gather Victim Host Info: Client Configs | Browser/OS fingerprinting via watering hole |
| T1589.001 | Gather Victim Identity Info: Credentials | Credential stuffing lists, breach databases |
| T1589.002 | Gather Victim Identity Info: Email Addresses | theHarvester, Hunter.io, LinkedIn scraping |
| T1598.003 | Phishing for Information: Spearphishing Link | Fake login page to harvest creds pre-compromise |
| T1593.001 | Search Open Websites: Social Media | LinkedIn, Twitter recon for org chart and tech stack |
| T1596.005 | Search Open Technical Databases: Scan DBs | Shodan, Censys, FOFA for exposed services |
| T1597.001 | Search Closed Sources: Threat Intel Vendors | Purchase target intel from underground forums |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1583.001 | Acquire Infrastructure: Domains | Typosquat and lookalike domains for phishing |
| T1583.003 | Acquire Infrastructure: VPS | Bulletproof hosting, cloud VPS for C2 |
| T1583.006 | Acquire Infrastructure: Web Services | GitHub, Azure, AWS for payload staging |
| T1584.001 | Compromise Infrastructure: Domains | Hijack expired or vulnerable domains |
| T1584.004 | Compromise Infrastructure: Server | Compromised web servers as C2 redirectors |
| T1587.001 | Develop Capabilities: Malware | Custom implants, RATs, loaders |
| T1587.003 | Develop Capabilities: Digital Certificates | Self-signed or stolen certs for code signing |
| T1585.001 | Establish Accounts: Social Media | Fake personas for social engineering |
| T1585.002 | Establish Accounts: Email Accounts | Disposable email for phishing infrastructure |
| T1588.002 | Obtain Capabilities: Tool | Cobalt Strike, Brute Ratel, Sliver licenses or cracks |
| T1588.005 | Obtain Capabilities: Exploits | Purchase 0-day or n-day exploit code |
| T1608.001 | Stage Capabilities: Upload Malware | Host payloads on compromised or rented infra |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1566.001 | Spearphishing Attachment | Office macros, ISO, LNK, OneNote, HTA |
| T1566.002 | Spearphishing Link | Drive-by downloads, fake login pages |
| T1566.003 | Spearphishing via Service | Messages via LinkedIn, Slack, Teams |
| T1190 | Exploit Public-Facing Application | CVEs on VPN, Exchange, web apps, firewalls |
| T1133 | External Remote Services | VPN/RDP with valid or sprayed credentials |
| T1078 | Valid Accounts | Compromised creds from OSINT/breach databases |
| T1078.004 | Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts | Stolen OAuth tokens, compromised Azure/AWS creds |
| T1195.002 | Supply Chain Compromise: Software | Trojanized updates (SolarWinds, 3CX, Kaseya) |
| T1199 | Trusted Relationship | Compromise MSP or vendor with target access |
| T1091 | Replication Through Removable Media | USB drop attacks, BadUSB |
| T1189 | Drive-by Compromise | Browser exploit via watering hole site |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1059.001 | PowerShell | AMSI bypass + encoded commands, Invoke-Expression |
| T1059.003 | Windows Command Shell | cmd.exe, wscript, mshta, forfiles |
| T1059.005 | Visual Basic | VBScript via wscript, Office VBA macros |
| T1059.006 | Python | Python-based implants, pyinstaller payloads |
| T1059.007 | JavaScript | JScript via wscript/cscript, Node.js |
| T1106 | Native API | Direct WinAPI calls (CreateProcess, NtAllocateVirtualMemory) |
| T1204.001 | User Execution: Malicious Link | User clicks phishing link |
| T1204.002 | User Execution: Malicious File | User double-clicks executable, opens macro doc |
| T1047 | Windows Management Instrumentation | wmic process call create, WMI event subscriptions |
| T1569.002 | System Services: Service Execution | PsExec, sc start, services as execution vector |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task/Job | schtasks /create for deferred execution |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1547.001 | Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder | HKCU\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Run |
| T1053.005 | Scheduled Task | schtasks /create with SYSTEM privileges |
| T1543.003 | Windows Service | sc create / New-Service for persistent backdoor |
| T1574.002 | DLL Side-Loading | Malicious DLL in legitimate application directory |
| T1136.001 | Create Account: Local | net user /add, hidden admin accounts |
| T1136.002 | Create Account: Domain | AD account creation for persistent access |
| T1546.003 | WMI Event Subscription | Fileless persistence via WMI consumers |
| T1546.015 | COM Hijacking | Replace COM object references in registry |
| T1505.003 | Web Shell | ASPX, PHP, JSP shells on web servers |
| T1098 | Account Manipulation | Add creds to service principal, modify ACLs |
| T1556.001 | Modify Authentication Process: Domain Controller | Skeleton Key, SSP injection on DC |
| T1197 | BITS Jobs | Background Intelligent Transfer for persistent downloads |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1548.002 | Bypass UAC | fodhelper, eventvwr, CMSTPLUA COM object |
| T1068 | Exploitation for Privilege Escalation | Kernel/driver CVEs (PrintNightmare, EternalBlue) |
| T1134.001 | Token Impersonation/Theft | SeImpersonatePrivilege, Potato family attacks |
| T1134.002 | Create Process with Token | CreateProcessWithToken, RunAs |
| T1611 | Escape to Host | Container escape to underlying host |
| T1055 | Process Injection | Inject shellcode into privileged process |
| T1078.002 | Valid Accounts: Domain | Escalate via stolen Domain Admin creds |
| T1547.012 | Print Processors | Register malicious print processor DLL |
| T1574.001 | DLL Search Order Hijacking | Place DLL in search path before legitimate |
| T1484.001 | Group Policy Modification | Modify GPO for domain-wide escalation |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1562.001 | Disable or Modify Tools | Kill AV/EDR, disable Defender real-time protection |
| T1562.004 | Disable or Modify Firewall | netsh advfirewall set allprofiles state off |
| T1027.002 | Obfuscated Files: Software Packing | UPX, custom packers, crypters |
| T1027.010 | Command Obfuscation | Base64, XOR, string concatenation, Invoke-Obfuscation |
| T1055.012 | Process Hollowing | Spawn legitimate process, hollow and inject |
| T1055.001 | DLL Injection | LoadLibrary injection into remote process |
| T1070.001 | Clear Windows Event Logs | wevtutil cl Security/System/Application |
| T1070.004 | File Deletion | Remove dropped tools and artifacts |
| T1218.011 | Rundll32 | LOLBin execution via signed binary |
| T1218.005 | Mshta | Execute HTA payloads via mshta.exe |
| T1036.005 | Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name | svchost.exe, csrss.exe lookalikes |
| T1112 | Modify Registry | Disable security features via registry edits |
| T1140 | Deobfuscate/Decode Files | Decode payload at runtime to evade static analysis |
| T1620 | Reflective Code Loading | In-memory .NET assembly loading, BOFs |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1003.001 | OS Credential Dumping: LSASS Memory | Mimikatz sekurlsa::logonpasswords, nanodump |
| T1003.003 | OS Credential Dumping: NTDS | ntdsutil, secretsdump.py against AD database |
| T1003.006 | OS Credential Dumping: DCSync | Mimikatz lsadump::dcsync, impacket secretsdump |
| T1558.003 | Kerberoasting | Crack service ticket hash offline (hashcat -m 13100) |
| T1558.004 | AS-REP Roasting | GetNPUsers.py, accounts without preauth |
| T1110.003 | Password Spraying | One password across many accounts |
| T1110.001 | Password Guessing | Brute force against single account |
| T1555.003 | Credentials from Web Browsers | Chrome/Firefox saved passwords, cookies |
| T1555.005 | Password Managers | KeePass, LastPass vault extraction |
| T1552.001 | Unsecured Credentials: Files | Config files, scripts with hardcoded passwords |
| T1552.006 | Unsecured Credentials: Cloud Instance Metadata | IMDS 169.254.169.254 token theft |
| T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | Keylogger deployment for credential harvest |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1087.002 | Domain Account Discovery | net user /domain, Get-ADUser |
| T1087.001 | Local Account Discovery | net user, whoami /all |
| T1069.002 | Domain Groups | Get-ADGroupMember "Domain Admins" |
| T1018 | Remote System Discovery | arp -a, nmap, nbtscan, net view |
| T1082 | System Information Discovery | systeminfo, uname -a, hostname |
| T1046 | Network Service Discovery | nmap -sV, port scanning internal ranges |
| T1016 | System Network Configuration | ipconfig, route print, netstat |
| T1049 | System Network Connections | netstat -an, ss -tlnp |
| T1083 | File and Directory Discovery | dir, find, locate sensitive files |
| T1482 | Domain Trust Discovery | nltest /domain_trusts, Get-ADTrust |
| T1615 | Group Policy Discovery | gpresult /r, Get-GPO |
| T1033 | System Owner/User Discovery | whoami, quser, w |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1021.001 | Remote Desktop Protocol | Pivot via RDP with stolen creds |
| T1021.002 | SMB/Windows Admin Shares | PsExec, smbexec via ADMIN$, C$ shares |
| T1021.003 | DCOM | Remote execution via DCOM objects |
| T1021.006 | Windows Remote Management | WinRM, Enter-PSSession, evil-winrm |
| T1550.002 | Pass the Hash | PtH with NTLM hash (impacket, CrackMapExec) |
| T1550.003 | Pass the Ticket | PtT with TGT/ST Kerberos tickets |
| T1550.001 | Application Access Token | Reuse OAuth/JWT tokens across services |
| T1021.004 | SSH | Lateral movement via SSH with stolen keys |
| T1080 | Taint Shared Content | Place payloads in network shares |
| T1570 | Lateral Tool Transfer | Move tools between compromised hosts |
| T1563.002 | RDP Hijacking | tscon session hijack without password |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1560.001 | Archive via Utility | 7z, rar, zip for staging collected data |
| T1560.003 | Archive via Custom Method | Custom encryption/compression before exfil |
| T1119 | Automated Collection | Scripts to sweep file shares for sensitive docs |
| T1115 | Clipboard Data | Monitor clipboard for passwords, sensitive data |
| T1530 | Data from Cloud Storage | S3 bucket enumeration, Azure blob access |
| T1213.002 | Data from Information Repositories: SharePoint | Scrape SharePoint/Confluence for docs |
| T1114.002 | Remote Email Collection | Outlook Web Access, Graph API mailbox access |
| T1114.001 | Local Email Collection | PST file extraction from local Outlook |
| T1056.001 | Input Capture: Keylogging | Keylogger for credential and data capture |
| T1113 | Screen Capture | Screenshots of user activity |
| T1125 | Video Capture | Webcam access for surveillance |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1071.001 | Web Protocols: HTTPS | C2 over HTTPS (Cobalt Strike, Havoc, Sliver) |
| T1071.004 | DNS | DNS tunneling (dnscat2, iodine) |
| T1071.002 | File Transfer Protocols | FTP/SFTP for C2 communication |
| T1095 | Non-Application Layer Protocol | C2 over ICMP, raw TCP/UDP |
| T1572 | Protocol Tunneling | SSH tunnel, chisel, ligolo-ng, cloudflared |
| T1090.003 | Multi-hop Proxy | Tor, proxychains, redirector chains |
| T1090.001 | Internal Proxy | SOCKS proxy via compromised host |
| T1105 | Ingress Tool Transfer | Download additional tools to target |
| T1132.001 | Standard Encoding | Base64-encoded C2 traffic |
| T1573.002 | Encrypted Channel: Asymmetric Crypto | TLS/SSL encrypted C2 channels |
| T1102 | Web Service | C2 via Telegram, Slack, Discord, GitHub |
| T1568.002 | Dynamic Resolution: Domain Generation | DGA for resilient C2 infrastructure |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1041 | Exfiltration Over C2 Channel | Data exfil through existing C2 connection |
| T1048.002 | Exfiltration Over Asymmetric Encrypted Non-C2 | HTTPS POST to attacker-controlled server |
| T1048.003 | Exfiltration Over Unencrypted Non-C2 | DNS, ICMP, HTTP exfiltration channels |
| T1567.002 | Exfiltration to Cloud Storage | Upload to Mega, Google Drive, Dropbox, S3 |
| T1029 | Scheduled Transfer | Timed exfil to blend with normal traffic |
| T1537 | Transfer Data to Cloud Account | Move data to attacker-controlled cloud account |
| T1052.001 | Exfiltration Over Physical Medium: USB | Copy data to removable media |
| T1020 | Automated Exfiltration | Scripted continuous data exfiltration |
| T1030 | Data Transfer Size Limits | Chunk data to avoid DLP thresholds |
| ID | Technique | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| T1486 | Data Encrypted for Impact | Ransomware encryption (LockBit, BlackCat, Conti) |
| T1485 | Data Destruction | Wipe files, databases, backups |
| T1561.002 | Disk Wipe: Disk Structure | MBR/GPT wipe (NotPetya, WhisperGate) |
| T1561.001 | Disk Wipe: Disk Content | Overwrite disk content sector by sector |
| T1489 | Service Stop | Stop critical services, disable backups |
| T1496 | Resource Hijacking | Cryptomining on compromised infrastructure |
| T1531 | Account Access Removal | Lock out legitimate users, reset passwords |
| T1490 | Inhibit System Recovery | Delete shadow copies, disable recovery mode |
| T1498 | Network Denial of Service | DDoS against target infrastructure |
| T1529 | System Shutdown/Reboot | Force reboot to complete destructive actions |
This is a curated selection of the most active threat groups in 2024-2025. MITRE documents 140+ groups. For the complete list, see MITRE ATT&CK Groups.
Russia:
| Group | Unit | Notable Techniques | Key Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| APT29 / Cozy Bear | SVR | T1059.001 PowerShell, T1071.001 HTTPS C2, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1550.002 PtH | SolarWinds (2020), Microsoft 365 (2024) |
| APT28 / Fancy Bear | GRU Unit 26165 | T1566 Spearphishing, T1003 Credential Dumping, T1090 Proxy, T1068 Exploit | DNC hack (2016), Outlook zero-day CVE-2023-23397 |
| Sandworm / Voodoo Bear | GRU Unit 74455 | T1486 Ransomware, T1561 Disk Wipe, T1489 Service Stop | NotPetya (2017), Industroyer2 (2022), Prestige (2022) |
| Turla / Venomous Bear | FSB Center 16 | T1071.004 DNS C2, T1055 Process Injection, T1027 Obfuscation | Snake implant (20+ years), satellite C2 hijacking |
China:
| Group | Unit | Notable Techniques | Key Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| APT41 / Winnti | MSS contractor | T1190 Exploit Public Apps, T1059.001 PS, T1053 Scheduled Task, T1505.003 Webshell | Supply chain (CCleaner 2017), gaming industry |
| Volt Typhoon | PLA | T1190 Exploit, T1218 LOLBins, T1071.001 Living-off-the-Land | US critical infra pre-positioning (2023-2025) |
| APT10 / Stone Panda | MSS Tianjin | T1199 Trusted Relationship, T1071.001 HTTPS, T1560 Archive Data | Cloud Hopper (MSP targeting) |
| APT40 / Leviathan | MSS Hainan | T1190 Exploit Public Apps, T1021.002 SMB, T1003 Credential Dump | Maritime/defense targeting |
| Mustang Panda | PLA SSF | T1566.001 Spearphishing, T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading, T1105 Tool Transfer | SE Asia government targeting |
| Salt Typhoon | MSS | T1190 Exploit, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1557 Adversary-in-the-Middle | US telecom interception (2024-2025) |
North Korea:
| Group | Unit | Notable Techniques | Key Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Lazarus Group | RGB Bureau 121 | T1566.001 Macro docs, T1055 Process Injection, T1486 Ransomware, T1496 Crypto | Sony (2014), WannaCry (2017), Ronin Bridge ($625M 2022) |
| Kimsuky | RGB | T1566 Spearphishing, T1059.005 VBS, T1056.001 Keylogging | South Korean government/think tanks |
| Andariel / Onyx Sleet | RGB | T1190 Exploit, T1059 Command Scripting, T1486 Ransomware | Defense/aerospace targeting, Maui ransomware |
Iran:
| Group | Unit | Notable Techniques | Key Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| MuddyWater | MOIS | T1566 Spearphishing, T1059.001 PS, T1105 Tool Transfer | Middle East government/telecom |
| Charming Kitten / APT35 | IRGC-IO | T1566 Spearphishing, T1078 Valid Accounts, T1114 Email Collection | Journalists/activists/diaspora targeting |
| OilRig / APT34 | MOIS | T1071.004 DNS C2, T1059.001 PS, T1003 Credential Dump | Oil/gas sector, DNS tunneling pioneer |
| CyberAv3ngers | IRGC-CEC | T1190 Exploit, T1489 Service Stop | Unitronics PLC targeting (water systems 2023) |
Cybercrime / Ransomware:
| Group | Type | Notable Techniques | Key Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| FIN7 / Carbanak | Financial crime | T1566.001 Phishing, T1059.001 PS, T1105 Tool Transfer | Hospitality/retail PoS ($1B+ stolen) |
| FIN11 / Clop | Financial crime + RaaS | T1190 Exploit (MOVEit, GoAnywhere), T1486 Ransomware, T1567 Cloud Exfil | MOVEit mass exploitation (2023, 2000+ orgs) |
| ALPHV / BlackCat | Ransomware-as-a-Service | T1486 Ransomware, T1490 Inhibit Recovery, T1489 Service Stop | Change Healthcare ($22M ransom 2024), exit scam |
| LockBit | Ransomware-as-a-Service | T1486 Ransomware, T1021.002 SMB, T1490 Delete Shadow Copies | Most prolific RaaS 2022-2024, seized Feb 2024 |
| Scattered Spider | Social engineering | T1566 Phishing, T1621 MFA Fatigue, T1078 Valid Accounts | MGM/Caesars (2023), Okta customers |
| Black Basta | Ransomware-as-a-Service | T1566.001 Spearphishing, T1219 Remote Access Tools, T1486 Ransomware | Ex-Conti members, 500+ victims |
Other:
| Group | Attribution | Notable Techniques | Key Operations |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sea Turtle | Turkey - intelligence | T1584 Compromise Infrastructure, T1557 DNS Hijacking | DNS registry hijacking (2019) |
| APT32 / OceanLotus | Vietnam - MPS | T1566 Spearphishing, T1059.001 PS, T1574.002 DLL Side-Loading | Journalists, dissidents, foreign corps in Vietnam |
| SideWinder | India - military | T1566.001 Spearphishing, T1203 Exploit Client, T1059.001 PS | Pakistan/China government targeting |
| Transparent Tribe / APT36 | Pakistan - ISI | T1566 Spearphishing, T1059.005 VBS, T1056.001 Keylogging | India military/government |
| Tactic | Primary Data Source | Key Detections |
|---|---|---|
| Reconnaissance | External threat intel, DNS logs, honeypot logs | Port scan alerts, credential leak monitoring, dark web mentions |
| Resource Development | Certificate transparency, domain registration feeds | New lookalike domains, suspicious cert issuance |
| Initial Access | Email gateway logs, WAF logs, VPN logs | Malicious attachment analysis, URL reputation, anomalous login location |
| Execution | Process creation (Sysmon EID 1), Script Block Logging (EID 4104) | Suspicious parent-child process trees, encoded commands, AMSI events |
| Persistence | Registry monitoring (Sysmon EID 13), scheduled tasks (EID 4698) | New Run key, new service creation, new scheduled task, WMI subscription |
| Privilege Escalation | Process token events (EID 4672), Sysmon EID 10 | Unexpected SYSTEM processes, UAC bypass patterns, token manipulation |
| Defense Evasion | Module load (Sysmon EID 7), file creation (EID 11) | Unsigned DLL loads, masquerading binary names, log clearing (EID 1102) |
| Credential Access | LSASS access (Sysmon EID 10), auth logs (EID 4625/4768) | LSASS memory access, Kerberoast (EID 4769 with RC4), password spray |
| Discovery | Process creation, PowerShell logging | Rapid enumeration commands, BloodHound collector activity |
| Lateral Movement | Logon events (EID 4624 type 3/10), SMB (Sysmon EID 3) | Remote service creation, PtH (NTLM type 3), anomalous RDP sessions |
| Collection | File access (Sysmon EID 11), email audit logs | Mass file access, archive creation, mailbox export |
| Command and Control | Network flow, DNS logs, proxy logs | Beaconing patterns, DNS tunneling entropy, unusual user-agents |
| Exfiltration | DLP, proxy logs, cloud API logs | Large outbound transfers, unusual cloud uploads, DNS data exfil |
| Impact | Volume shadow copy events, service control events | Shadow copy deletion (vssadmin), mass file modification, service stops |
Source: Microsoft Learn - Sysmon Events (verified Feb 2026). Log location: Applications and Services Logs > Microsoft > Windows > Sysmon > Operational.
| EID | Event | Detection Use | Volume |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | Process Creation | Suspicious process trees, LOLBin execution, command-line inspection | High |
| 2 | File Creation Time Change | Timestomping detection - process modifies file creation timestamp to hide artifacts | Low |
| 3 | Network Connection | C2 callbacks, lateral movement, beaconing (disabled by default, enable selectively) | Very High |
| 5 | Process Terminated | Complete execution timelines, detect short-lived processes | Medium |
| 6 | Driver Loaded | Rootkit / BYOVD detection - kernel driver load with signature and hash info | Low |
| 7 | Image Loaded (DLL) | DLL side-loading, unsigned module loads, injection detection | Very High |
| 8 | CreateRemoteThread | Process injection detection - high signal, low volume | Low |
| 10 | Process Access | LSASS credential dumping - noisy, use with targeted filtering | High |
| 11 | File Create | Payload drops, webshell creation, staging detection | High |
| 12/13/14 | Registry Key/Value Create, Set, Rename | Persistence via registry (Run keys, services, COM hijack) | High |
| 15 | FileCreateStreamHash | Alternate Data Stream (ADS) detection, Zone.Identifier / Mark-of-the-Web | Low |
| 17 | Pipe Created | C2 named pipes creation (Cobalt Strike SMB beacon default \postex_*) |
Low |
| 18 | Pipe Connected | Named pipe connection - lateral movement via SMB pipes | Low |
| 19/20/21 | WMI Filter, Consumer, Binding | WMI persistence - fileless malware uses WMI event subscriptions | Low |
| 22 | DNS Query | C2 domain resolution, DGA detection, beaconing patterns | High |
| 23 | File Delete (archived) | Ransomware mass deletion, evidence destruction - file content preserved | Medium |
| 25 | Process Tampering | Process hollowing, herpaderping, ghosting - advanced malware evasion | Low |
| 26 | File Delete Logged | File deletion with hash (no content archive, lighter than EID 23) | Medium |
| 27/28/29 | Executable File Detect/Block | Executable staging detection - new in Sysmon 15+, can block exe creation | Low |
Source: Sysmon for Linux. Limited subset of Windows Sysmon. Same Event IDs for cross-platform correlation.
| EID | Event | Linux Notes |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | Process Creation | execve syscall, full command line + hashes |
| 3 | Network Connection | TCP/UDP connects via connect() syscall |
| 5 | Process Terminated | Process exit via exit_group |
| 9 | RawAccessRead | Direct disk read (dd, raw device access) |
| 11 | File Create | open() with O_CREAT, creat() |
| 16 | Config Change | Sysmon config reload |
| 23 | File Delete | unlink() / unlinkat() with file archive |
Missing on Linux (no equivalent): EID 2 (timestomp), 6 (driver), 7 (DLL), 8 (thread injection), 10 (process access), 12-15 (registry/ADS - N/A), 17-18 (named pipes), 19-21 (WMI - N/A), 22 (DNS), 25 (tampering), 27-29 (exe blocking).
Sources: Ultimate Windows Security, ManageEngine EID 7045.
| EID | Log | Event | Detection Use |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1102 | Security | Audit Log Cleared | Anti-forensics, defense evasion |
| 4624 | Security | Logon Success | Lateral movement (type 3=network, 10=RDP), valid account use |
| 4625 | Security | Logon Failure | Password spray, brute force |
| 4648 | Security | Explicit Credential Logon | RunAs / credential use across systems |
| 4672 | Security | Special Privileges Assigned | Privileged logon monitoring (SeDebugPrivilege, etc.) |
| 4688 | Security | Process Creation | Execution monitoring (requires "Audit Process Creation" + command line) |
| 4697 | Security | Service Installed in System | Service persistence (requires "Audit Security System Extension") |
| 4698 | Security | Scheduled Task Created | Persistence via scheduled tasks |
| 4720 | Security | User Account Created | New account for persistence |
| 4657 | Security | Registry Value Modified | Registry persistence (Run keys, services) - requires "Audit Registry" |
| 4768 | Security | TGT Requested (AS-REQ) | AS-REP roasting: look for encryption type 0x17 (RC4) |
| 4769 | Security | Service Ticket Requested (TGS-REQ) | Kerberoasting: encryption type 0x17 (RC4) for service accounts |
| 5156 | Security | WFP Connection Allowed | Outbound connections (alternative to Sysmon EID 3 without Sysmon) |
| 7045 | System | New Service Installed | Service persistence, PsExec, lateral move. Note: System log, not Security |
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment
|
T1204.002 User Execution: Malicious File
|
T1059.001 PowerShell (Cobalt Strike beacon)
|
T1547.001 Registry Run Key (persistence)
|
T1003.001 LSASS Dump (credential harvest)
|
T1021.002 SMB/Admin Shares (lateral movement)
|
T1490 Inhibit System Recovery (delete shadows)
|
T1486 Data Encrypted for Impact (ransomware)
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
|
T1059.001 PowerShell (initial payload)
|
T1053.005 Scheduled Task (persistence)
|
T1003.001 LSASS / T1003.006 DCSync
|
T1087.002 Domain Account Discovery
|
T1021.001 RDP / T1021.006 WinRM
|
T1560.001 Archive Collected Data (7z/rar)
|
T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1598.003 Phishing for Information (cred harvest)
|
T1078 Valid Accounts (compromised mailbox)
|
T1114.002 Remote Email Collection
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T1534 Internal Spearphishing
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T1657 Financial Theft (wire fraud)
T1195.002 Supply Chain: Software Supply Chain
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T1059.001 PowerShell (post-install execution)
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T1547.001 Registry Run Key (persistence)
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T1071.001 HTTPS C2 (blends with update traffic)
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T1041 Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
T1078.004 Valid Accounts: Cloud Accounts
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T1538 Cloud Service Dashboard
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T1580 Cloud Infrastructure Discovery
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T1530 Data from Cloud Storage (S3/Blob)
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T1537 Transfer Data to Cloud Account
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application
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T1059.003 Windows Command Shell
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T1218.011 Rundll32 (LOLBin proxy exec)
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T1003.001 LSASS (comsvcs.dll minidump)
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T1021.006 WinRM (native lateral movement)
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T1048.003 Exfil Over DNS (no malware dropped)
Interactive visualization of detection coverage by tactic and technique. Map your security controls (EDR, SIEM, honeypots) to ATT&CK techniques to identify detection blind spots. This widget covers a curated subset of the most critical techniques. For the full 200+ technique matrix, use the official ATT&CK Navigator.
Map behavioral indicators (IOBs), observed procedures, and APT groups to ATT&CK techniques. Generate exportable Navigator layers.
Build ready-to-run atomic tests per ATT&CK technique to validate your detections: pick a technique, get the executor command with its input arguments.